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Countermeasures for Timing-Based Side-Channel 
Attacks against Shared, Modern Computing Hardware  
  
 
Abstract: There are several vulnerabilities in computing systems hardware that 
can be exploited by attackers to carry out devastating Microarchitectural Timing-
Based Side-Channel Attacks against these systems and as a result compromise the 
security of the users of such systems. By exploiting Microarchitectural resources, 
adversaries can potentially launch different variants of Timing Attacks, for 
instance, to leak sensitive information through timing. In view of these security 
threats against computing hardware, in a recent study, titled “Are Timing-Based 
Side-Channel Attacks Feasible in Shared, Modern Computing Hardware?”, 
currently undergoing the review process, we presented and analysed several such 
attacks. This extended study proceeds to build upon our recent study in question. 
To this end, we analyse the existing countermeasures against Timing Attacks and 
propose new strategies in dealing with such attacks. 
 
Keywords: side channels; timing attacks; hardware attacks; channel attacks; 
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1. Introduction 
In recent years, Side-Channel Attacks, hereafter referred to as SCAs, have grown 
from theoretical attacks (Kelsey et al., 2000; Kocher et al., 1999; Chari et al., 1999; Kocher, 
1996; Rivest et al., 1978;) to highly advanced and practical attacks on general-purpose 
computing platforms (Gruss et al., 2017, a; Gruss et al., 2017, b; Schwarz et al., 2017; 
Irazoqui et al., 2016; Spreitzer et al., 2016; Pessl et al., 2016; Brumley and Boneh, 2003) 
and cloud computing infrastructures (Xiao et al., 2016; Liu et al., 2015; Zafirt, 2015; Zhang 
et al., 2014), and finally to attacks on mobile platforms (Lipp et al., 2016; Song et al., 2016; 
Chen et al., 2014; Sarwar et al., 2013). This growth has been the result of a consistent 
evolution of performance optimisation of modern microarchitectures that simultaneously 
manage multiple hardware resources (Thomas, 2017; Irazoqui, 2017; Borkar and Chien, 
2011). SCAs pose serious security threats to modern and shared computing hardware (Ge 
et al., 2016; Liu et al., 2015; Xiao and Xiao, 2013; Kong, 2009). They are the result of 
spatial and temporal sharing of processor components between various applications as they 
run on the processor. A SCA – both theoretical (Chari et al., 1999; Kocher, 1996; Hu, 1992, 
Page, 2002) and practical (Xiao et al., 2016; Zhang et al., 2014; Yarom and Falkner, 2014; 
Bernstein, 2005; Osvik et al., 2006) – is carried out, for instance, through the exploitation 
of inadvertent information leakage from computing hardware (Gruss et al., 2017, a; Gruss 
et al., 2017, b; Spreitzer et al., 2016) or through the exploitation of Microarchitectural 
channels in order to deduce secrete keys such as those utilised in symmetric cryptography 
(Inci et al., 2016; Yarom and Benger, 2014; Zhang et al., 2014). 
 
Various systems have inherent side-channel vulnerabilities that can be exploited 
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
    
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
by the attackers to launch devastating SCAs. For instance, an adversary can simply carry 
out a differential power analysis (Cryptography Research, Inc et al., 2017; Moradi et al., 
2011; Kocher et al., 2011; Barenghi et al., 2010; Coppens et al., 2009; Schramm et al., 
2004; Guilley et al., 2004; Kocher et al., 2004) or monitor electromagnetic radiation 
(Longo et al., 2015; Hayashi et al., 2013; Homma et al., 2010), etc., in order to deduce vital 
data from the victims’ systems (Gruss et al., 2017, a; Gruss et al., 2017, b; Zhang and Lee, 
2014; Xiao et al., 2016; Irazoqui et al., 2016). Furthermore, processor architecture features 
including simultaneous multithreading (Tromer et al., 2010; Aciiçmez et al., 2007; 
Percival, 2005), control speculation and shared caches (Steffan et al., 2000; Tsai and Yew, 
1996) can unintentionally accelerate side channels or enable new side channels (Yarom 
and Falkner, 2014; Wang and Lee, 2007). As a result, attackers can detect and exploit 
contention between hardware threads on the multiplier unit (Ge et al., 2016; Guan et al., 
2015; Chen and Venkataramani, 2014). Such contention can be also exploited to create a 
side channel (Liu et al., 2016; Hunger et al., 2015; Ristenpart et al., 2009), for instance, to 
enable a malicious thread to differentiate multiplications from squaring in OpenSSL’s RSA 
implementation (Aciiçmez, and Schindler, 2008; Wang and Lee, 2007). These attacks can 
determine the latency which result from contentious threats that are made to wait for access 
to functional units (Ge et al., 2016; Tromer et al., 2010; Ristenpart et al., 2009).  
 
In view of the above security threats posed by SCAs against computing hardware, 
in a recent study, titled “Are Timing-Based Side-Channel Attacks Feasible in Shared, 
Modern Computing Hardware?” (Montasari et al., submitted), currently under the review 
process, we identified and analysed several Timing-Based Side-Channel Attacks, hereon 
abbreviated to TBSCA, a variant of SCAs (in the paper, SCAs have organised into a 
taxonomy of 13 distinct sub-categories). This extended study proceeds to build upon the 
study in question (Montasari et al., submitted) by analysing the existing countermeasures 
against Timing Attacks and proposing new strategies in mitigating such attacks. 
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides a 
background for Microarchitectural Analysis, while Section 3 provides a brief review of the 
of SCAs proposed in the Literature. Countermeasures to address TBSCAs are then 
provided in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 concludes the study by providing a detailed 
discussion about trends in attacks and the future research direction in this research field. 
Two main contributions of this paper are the scope of the discussion as demonstrated in 
Table 1, since few works of similar scope currently exist, and the provision of an agenda 
for the direction of future research. Table 1 maps our work to the existing similar surveys 
on the subject. 
 
Table 1. The scope of our work compared to the existing survey papers on the subject. 
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2. Background and Related Work 
Since gaining attention in 2003, when Brumley and Boneh (2003) carried out a 
successful remote timing attack on real applications over a local network (Brumley and 
Boneh, 2003), research efforts have been made on the security analysis of PC platforms 
from a side-channel perspective (Gornik et al., 2015; Kong et al., 2008; Aciiçmez, 2007). 
The research community's realisation that the performance of some microprocessors could 
create critical side-channel emissions has led to the birth of the Microarchitectural Analysis 
research field, which is now an emerging area of side-channel cryptanalysis. 
Microarchitecture represents the method by which a specific instruction set architecture 
(ISA) is implemented in a particular processor (Flynn, 2007; Murdocca and Heuring, 2007; 
Clements, 2006), and Microarchitectural Analysis (MA) examines the impacts of common 
processor components and their performance upon the security of software cryptosystems 
(Ge et al., 2016; Aciiçmez, 2007; Osvik et al., 2006). Microarchitectural Attacks take 
advantage of the microarchitectural features of a processor to expose cryptographic keys. 
The performance of some processor components creates data-dependent variations in terms 
of runtime and power consumption signatures, during the execution of cryptosystems. Such 
variations either directly leak out the key value during a single cipher execution or emit 
information that can be collected during many executions and examined to exploit the 
system. To launch a SCA, adversaries do not require elevated system privileges as all the 
malicious activities are performed within their authorised privilege level. Attackers require 
neither knowledge of the plaintext, nor the ciphertext (Zhang et al., 2015; Zhang and Lee, 
2014; Gullasch et al., 2011; Osvik et al., 2006). 
 
With the rapid evolution of MA, in the years that have followed since 2003, 
researchers have been able to illustrate SCAs based on changes in different computing 
settings (Gruss et al., 2017, a; Gruss et al., 2017, b; Spreitzer et al., 2017), including: AES 
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
    
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
(Zhang et al., 2016, b; Gullasch et al., 2011; Osvik et al., 2006), differential power analysis 
(Kocher et al., 2011; Barenghi et al., 2010; Guilley et al., 2004; Schramm et al., 2004; 
Kocher et al., 2004), monitor electromagnetic radiation (Longo et al., 2015; Hayashi et al., 
2013; Homma et al., 2010), sound and electromagnetic emission (Faruque et al., 2016; 
Genkin et al., 2014; Callan et al., 2014; Cai and Chen, 2011), photonic side-channel 
leakage emission (Carmon et al., 2017; Krämer et al., 2013; Schlösser et al., 2012) and 
many more. All such attacks necessitate adversaries to be able to have a physical access to 
the victim device so as to monitor and deduce the secret information (Gruss et al., 2017, a; 
Gruss et al., 2017, b; Ge et al., 2016; Spreitzer et al., 2016; Liu et al., 2015). However, the 
latest and more advanced SCAs including Cache-Timing Attacks (Ge et al., 2016; Yarom 
and Falkner, 2014; and Tromer et al., 2010) and DRAM row buffer attacks (Gruss et al., 
2017, a; Gruss et al., 2017, b; Schwarz et al., 2017; Pessl et al., 2016) can be carried out 
remotely by running malicious software within a cloud setting (Spreitzer et al., 2016; Xiao 
et al., 2016; Irazoqui et al., 2016). 
 
Also with the emergence of cloud computing phenomenon, the extent of SCAs 
has also evolved considerably since 2000s (Spreitzer et al., 2016; Kim et al., 2012). 
Likewise, with the rapid advancements in mobile technology, researchers have been able 
to demonstrate even more sophisticated SCAs compromising smartphones (Spreitzer et al., 
2016; Song et al., 2016; Sarwar et al., 2013; Owusu et al., 2012; Lange et al., 2011). For 
instance, new attacks (Simon et al., 2016; Aviv et al., 2012; Xu et al., 2012; Cai and Chen, 
2011) enable adversaries to deduce keyboard input on touchscreens through “sensor 
readings from native apps” (Spreitzer et al., 2016; Kambourakis et al., 2016; Aviv et al., 
2012). Because typing on various places on the screen creates different vibrations, data 
from Motion (Cai and Chen, 2011), a SCA on touch screen smartphones with soft 
keyboards data, can be employed by an attacker to deduce the keys being typed. One of the 
methods to deduce keystrokes via the Motion, is to utilise a mobile application such as 
TouchLogger, an Android application that derives “features from device orientation data” 
(Cai and Chen, 2011). More advanced and new attacks can also enable the attackers to infer 
a user’s geographical location through the power consumption (Grus, 2017; Spreitzer et 
al., 2016; Mangard et al., 2008) and a victim’s identity through the procfs (Spreitzer et al., 
2016; Zhou et al., 2013) that is available from the proc filesystem (procfs) (Spreitzer et al., 
2016; Michalevsky et al., 2015). 
 
In the following section, we shall provide a brief review of various TBSCAs in 
relation to components of modern and shared PC platforms with references made also to 
other platforms (such as cloud computing and smart mobile phones, the analysis of which 
is beyond the scope of this paper) when relevant. To this end, a particular focus will be 
placed on TBSCAs with again making references to other variations of SCAs only when 
appropriate. 
 
3. Review of Side-Channel Attacks Proposed in the Literature 
Various researchers (Liu et al., 2015; Zhang et al., 2012; Aciiçmez et al., 2010; 
Tromer et al., 2010; Aciiçmez and Schindler, 2008; Aciiçmez, 2007; Osvik et al., 2005; 
Percival, 2005) have utilised Prime+Probe as a method of attack against different processor 
caches such as the L1 data cache, L1 instruction cache and also the branch prediction cache. 
For instance, Liu et al. (2015) demonstrated that a new type of Prime+Probe can be 
exploited for LLC attacks. Using their Prime+Probe attack technique, Liu et al leveraged 
hardware elements that are beyond the control of the cloud provider but often activated in 
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the VMM for operation reasons. Kim et al. (2012) proposed an StealthMem OS-based 
Technique, which is a system-level protection against TBSCAs in virtualised 
environments. StealthMem is based on software mechanism that places pages of a virtual 
machine into the cache and stops their ejection by other VMs.  In this respect, Barthe et al. 
(2014) have provided a formalisation of such an approach. Raj et al. (2009) suggested 
system-level protections for segregating machines in virtualised environments, including 
“cache-aware CPU core assignment” and “cache-aware memory-management”.   
 
Ford (2012) proposed information-flow control which is based on clear timing 
labels, along with OS support for its implementation. Wang and Suh (2012) demonstrated 
that on-chip network often dynamically shared between applications that running at the 
same time on a chip-multiprocessor (CMP) can facilitate timing attacks. In their study, 
Wang and Suh (2012) showed that these shared resources suggest that applications can 
impact each other's timing features via interference in shared resources, and revealed that 
such an interference is an attack vector by means of which a malign application can deduce 
data-dependent information about other applications. Ristenpart et al. (2009) illustrated 
that by performing a SCA, an adversary could potentially co-locate and detect co-location 
in public IaaS clouds. Similarly, Zhang et al. (2011) showed that a tenant could identify 
co-location in the same core by monitoring the L2 cache. In the same vain, Bates et al 
(2012) proposed a co-location test based on network traffic analysis. Zhang et al. (2014) 
revealed that the de-duplication allows co-location detection from co-located VMs in PaaS 
clouds. Inci et al. (2016) demonstrated that by performing the Prime+Probe attack, an 
attacker could extract an RSA secret key from a co-located instance in cloud environments. 
Yarom and Falkner (2014) showed that by performing the Flush+Reload Attack during 
memory de-duplication, an adversary would be able to extract RSA secret keys across co-
located VMs. Likewise, Bhattacharya and Mukhopadhyay (2015) demonstrated that by 
exploiting the branch prediction performance counters, an attacker could deduce RSA keys. 
 
Irazoqui et al. (2014) performed a cross-VM Flush+Reload Attacks against VMs 
in VMware by exploiting resource sharing features in virtual environments. As a result, 
they were able to extract an AES’ keys in OpenSSL 1.0.1 running inside the victim VM. 
Wang et al. (2014) illustrated that shared memory controllers are susceptible to SCAs that 
take advantage of memory interference as timing channels. Likewise, Evtyushkin et al. 
(2015) demonstrated that covert channels shared between processor resources can facilitate 
secret communication between malign processes. Utilising the processor branch prediction 
unit, Evtyushkin et al. (2015) showed the way in which a trojan and a spy can potentially 
compromise the branch prediction tables (BPT).  Similarly, Hunger et al (2015) 
demonstrated a covert channel through branch predictor that can transmit a 1 by executing 
a significant number of branches, each of which is taken with 50% probability that reduces 
the branch prediction accuracy of the receiver.  Although both Evtyushkin et al.’s (2015) 
and Hunger et al’s (2015) studies are similar in that each introduced a new covert channel 
that can enable adversaries to launch timing attacks, they have differences in the way of 
their implementations of these covert channels. For instance, in Hunger et al’s (2015) 
covert channel, the malicious activities during the transmission of a 1 generates the branch 
predictor property conflict, that is identified by the spy utilising performance counters. On 
the contrary, in Evtyushkin et al.’s (2015) proposed attack, a covert channel does not 
depend on branch predictor conflict but instead utilises the remaining state of the BPT. 
Furthermore, Evtyushkin et al.’s covert channel can be created without depending on 
performance counters by observing the runtime of the spy.   
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
    
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
Attackers can also exploit hardware threading to examine a competing thread’s 
L1 cache usage in real time (Ge et al., 2016; Percival, 2005). Simultaneous multithreading 
(the sharing of the operation resources of a superscalar processor between multiple 
execution threads) is a feature implemented into Intel Pentium 4 processors. Under this 
implementation, the sharing of processor resources between threads spreads beyond the 
operation units. This denotes that the threads also share access to the memory caches. Such 
shared access to memory caches can facilitate side channels and enable a malign thread 
with restricted privilege to scan the operation of another thread.  In turn, this results in 
allowing the attackers to steal cryptographic keys (Genkin et al., 2015; Liu et al., 2015; 
2015; Percival, 2005). In addition, by exploiting side-channel information based on CPU 
delay adversaries could potentially mount TBSCAs against the Data Encryption Standard 
(DES) implemented in some applications. Such cryptanalysis technique applies side-
channel information on encryption processing to gather plaintexts for cryptanalysis and 
infers the information on the extended key from the acquired plaintexts (Tsunoo et al., 
2003).  Through this attack, the adversary will be able to break the cipher with plaintexts.   
 
Furthermore, Time-Driven Attacks can be performed against AES (Crane et al., 
2015; Gullasch et al., 2011; Coppens et al., 2009; Bernstein, 2005, Percival, 2005) in a 
virtualisation setting (Weiß et al., 2014; Kim et al., 2012; Gullasch et al., 2011). An 
example of such an attack is that of the “PikeOS Microkernel Virtualization Framework” 
(Weiß et al., 2014) which was successfully mounted against AES on an actual CPS. 
KASLR has also been shown to be bypassed by applying the branch-target buffer. In their 
study, Evtyushkin et al. (2016) were able to locate the place in the kernel in which code 
had been run based on the mapping from virtual addresses to the branch-target buffer cache 
lines. Furthermore, a malign operating system can also reverse-engineer the control flow 
of SGX enclaves via branch-prediction analysis (Lee et al., 2016). In addition, adversaries 
might be able to mount Timing Attacks against secret-dependent data access patterns on 
the sliding-window modular exponentiation implementation (Liu et al., 2015; Aciiçmez et 
al. 2007; Brumley and Boneh, 2005). The scatter-gather technique, which is a commonly-
implemented method to stop time-based attacks, can also be exploited through a timing 
attack called CacheBleed (Yarom et al., 2017). CacheBleed, which is also a Timing-Based 
Side-Channel Attack, takes advantage of “cache-bank collisions” (Fog, 2017; Intel®, 
2016) to generate quantifiable timing differences (Ge et al., 2016).  
 
Instruction Cache (I-cache), a processor component, poses grave security 
susceptibilities, and as a result, it can be exploited in a TBSCA as a source of information 
emission. An I-Cache attack is capable of exposing full operation arrangement of a 
cryptosystem during a single execution. In this regard, Aciiçmez (2007) proposed a 
software-based I-cache attack on OpenSSL’s RSA implementation.  To demonstrate that 
I-cache attacks are capable of exposing the execution flow of cryptosystems such as RSA, 
that can result in a full breach if the cryptosystem is enforced with key-dependent execution 
flow. I-cache is capable of breaking into security systems even when robust security 
mechanisms such as sandboxing and virtualisation have been implemented as I-Cache 
leverages deep processor functionalities that are below the trust architecture boundary of 
such security implementations.  
 
Moreover, by performing a Cache Template Attack (CTA) (Gruss et al., 2015) 
adversaries will be able to profile and take advantage of cache-based information emission 
of programs automatically. To carry out this attack, attackers do not require to know the 
specific software versions or system information in advance. The CTA includes two stages 
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consisting of profiling phase and exploitation phase. In the profiling stage, the attacker 
establishes dependencies between the processing of private information such as certain key 
inputs or secret keys of cryptography and particular cache accesses. In the exploitation 
stage, the adversary exfiltrate the private keys having monitored cache accesses. Besides, 
the CTA has been shown to be capable of deducing keystrokes as well as detecting 
particular keys on Linux and Windows user interfaces. By performing this attack, 
adversaries will be able to conduct automated attacks on the Ttable-based AES design of 
OpenSSL. In addition, by exploiting the vulnerabilities found in OpenSSL 
implementations, such as their accesses to different data structures during square and 
multiplication processes, attackers will be able to deduce the process sequence of RSA by 
observing the cache activities (Percival, 2005).  
  
Likewise, adversaries can perform SCAs against ciphers that utilise table-lookups 
in large tables and AES (Daemen and Rijmen, 2013; NIST, 2001) because of the ciphers’ 
susceptibilities to such attacks (Osvik et al., 2006; Bernstein, 2005; Tsunoo et al., 2003). 
Through a SCA against ciphers, attackers will be able to acquire the secret key by taking 
advantage of the time that an AES process takes because of the storage of the large table 
in cache. Last, but not least, an adversary can also leverage hardware-based information 
emission by calculating the power consumption with an oscilloscope to launch a TBSCA. 
In this context, the attacker will need to have physical access to the victim device 
 
4. Countermeasures against Side-Channel Attacks 
This section provides potential countermeasures that can be adopted to mitigate 
TBSCAs against components of PC platforms such as a processor, a cache or memory as 
“The most commonly exploited leakage in the shared resource systems stem from the cache 
and the memory” (Inci et al., 2016). Despite the focus being on countermeasures for such 
components, nevertheless we make brief references to countermeasures for other platforms 
such as cloud environments. 
 
4.1 Noise Injection  
One way of mitigating a TBSCA is to inject noise into the adversary’s timing 
measurements in order to render the timing calculation ineffective (Ge et al., 2016; Hu, 
1992). Any form of SCAs such as Flush+Reload will require the availability of “High-
Resolution Clock” (Yarom and Falkner, 2014). Therefore, reduction in the resolution of 
clock or injecting noise to the clock measurement (Vattikonda et al., 2011; Hu, 1992) can 
be applied as a defence mechanism against TBSCAs. However, this countermeasure is 
restricted in its application because the adversary will be able to utilise other attack vectors 
to create high resolution clocks (Yarom and Falkner, 2014).  Furthermore, Fuzzy Time 
(Hu, 1992), a specific type of Noise Injection implemented in VAX security Kernel, 
includes a set of techniques that lowers bandwidths of Timing Channels by injecting too 
much noise to all clocks that are available to a computing operation such as pre-emptions 
and interrupt delivery. Compacting, Randomising and Preloading S-Box tables 
(implemented on most modern processors) (Brickell et al, 2006, a) can also be utilised to 
inject noise to the cache footprint emitted through AES operations (Ge et al., 2016). This 
technique helps to safeguard against a timing attack mounted by an adversary who cannot 
monitor cache access performance more often than the time needed by the cryptographic 
operation to run an AES session (Brickell et al., 2006, a; Bernstein, 2005). Therefore, the 
distribution of AES execution times for this implementation of AES, in which execution 
times are averaged, follows a “Gaussian” distribution over a significant number of random 
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
    
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
plaintexts. Figure 1., obtained from Brickell et al. (2006, a), represents such a measurement 
that has been taken based on Bernstein’s (2005) study. 
 
Figure 1. Average execution time cycle showing the distribution of execution times for 
Brickell et al.’s (2006, a) implementation of AES (Brickell et al., 2006, a). 
 
However, such techniques can bring about 100% to 120% performance overhead 
(Ge et al., 2016). Partition-Locked cache (PLcache) and Random Permutation cache 
(RPcache) (Wang and Lee, 2007) can also be employed as countermeasures in order to 
randomise cache indexing scheme and safeguard every attribute in every cache line. The 
“RPcache” is responsible for achieving the permutation of the memory-to-cache mapping. 
This is performed by applying indirection in cache indexing. A given process in RPcache 
contains a Permutation Table, that stores memory-to-cache mappings as demonstrated in 
Figure 2, adopted and modified from Wang and Lee’s (2007) study. 
 
Figure 2. The logical view of Wand and Lee’s proposed RPcache implementation (Wang 
and Lee, 2007). 
 
The number of entries in the table are equal to those in the cache sets, and each 
given entry includes a different “M-bit number”, that signifies the new set. Then, the 
permutation table is indexed with the M set bits for every specific cache access for every 
given cache access in order to acquire the new set bits, that are utilised to store the selection 
of the cache set. Every cache line includes an ID showing the process of its owner (Ge et 
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al., 2016; Wang and Lee, 2007). Those cache lines that have different IDs will not be able 
to eject each other. Instead, RPcache chooses a set of cache in a random manner and eject 
a cache line in the given set. Kong et al. (2009) question Wang and Lee’s (2007) proposed 
Partition-Locked cache (PLcache) and Random-Permutation cache (RPcache) methods 
arguing that despite the fact that they are effective in mitigating performance overhead and 
improving the security level, they might still be susceptible to advanced attacks themselves. 
As a result, they proceeded to propose their own countermeasure that they claimed to 
introduce various “trade-offs between hardware complexity and performance overhead”. 
This countermeasure, which is claimed to have low overhead, is based on the 
implementation of a ‘specific’ RPcache, that is aimed only at secret data including AES 
tables.  
  
The Xen hypervisor can also be adapted so that noise can be injected into the high-
resolution time measurements in VMs. This can be achieved by changing the values that 
are returned by the rdtsc instruction (Ge et al., 2016; Vattikonda et al., 2011). In addition, 
a timing channel can also be mitigated by rendering internal time sources imprecise; for 
instance, the implementation of the x86 rdtsc instruction can be adapted to stop operation 
till the end of a “a predefined epoch”, and then inserting a randomised number “between 
zero and the size of the epoch”, therefore fuzzing the time counter (Ge et al., 2016; Martin 
et al., 2012). In a cloud setting, bystander VMs can be employed to insert noise on the 
“cross-VM L2-cache covert channel” that has a configurable workload (Ge et al., 2016). 
Such a method can enable bystander workloads (on each server) to create high level of 
error to timing channels and therefore reduce the threat of cross-VM timing channels 
(Zhang et al., 2015). 
 
It should be noted that many of the existing solutions such as noise injection 
cannot provide a high level of security, a point also acknowledged by Cock et al. (2014). 
There are ways to increase the level of security offered by the existing solutions. For 
instance, creating anti-correlated noise can in theory block the timing channel. However, 
creating such trade-off is impractical in most situations. The level of actual noise needed 
grows significantly with the declining channel capacity. Therefore, this will result in 
significant degradation in system performance and renders it impossible to decrease 
channel bandwidth by “more than about two orders of magnitude” (Ge et al., 2016; Cock 
et al., 2014). 
 
4.2 Lattice Scheduling 
Arguing that hardware sharing results in timing-channel susceptibilities in 
hardware components including memory controllers and shared memory, Ferraiuolo et al. 
(2016) proposed Lattice Priority Scheduling (LPS), which is a memory scheduling 
algorithm that enhances performance by accurately fulfilling the target system’s security 
requirements.  Similarly, Wang et al. (2014) proposed a memory controller implementation 
that allows secure sharing of main memory between mistrusting parties by eradicating 
memory timing channels. Wang et al. (2014) determined the sources of interference in a 
conventional memory controller implementation and further introduced a protection design 
to remove the interference from security domains. Similarly, Cock et al. (2014) presented 
a “Lattice Scheduler” for the domain-switched version of seL4. Applying their 
“mechanisation of the probabilistic program logic pGCL”, Cock (2013) proposed a lattice 
scheduler (a mitigation method) using randomisation as a way of ensuring “starvation-
freeness”. Cock (2013) illustrated that their lattice scheduler imposed “probabilistic non-
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
    
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
leakage” as well as “probabilistic non-leakage”. This scheduler has been implemented in 
such a way to reduce information flow via a shared cache while ensuring fairness, 
simplicity and efficiency. 
 
4.3 Countermeasures against the Flush+Reload Attack 
To carry out a Flush+Reload Attack, an adversary will need to consider a set of 
four aspects (Yarom and Falkner, 2014), including: data flow from sensitive data to 
memory access patterns, memory sharing between the malicious and the victim processes, 
precise time calculations and the unrestricted use of the clflush instruction. Therefore, 
blocking any of these four elements will prevent this type of attack from occurrence. The 
X86 design does not provide permission checks for utilising the clflush instruction. The 
Flush+Reload Attack takes advantage of the fact that there are no limitations in relation to 
the usage of the clflush instruction. The absence of such usage limitations can be 
considered as a security laxity caused by Intel architecture of the X86 design. Therefore, 
one countermeasure would be to restrict the power of the clflush instruction, the key aim 
of which is to apply memory consistency (Intel® Corporation, 2016; Yarom and Falkner, 
2014).  
 
Software diversification (Forrest, 1997) can also be employed as a 
countermeasure to block memory page sharing and, therefore, to reduce the likelihood of 
the Flush+Reload Attack (Yarom and Falkner, 2014). Also, in virtual and cloud settings, 
Static Memory Deduplication (Kil et al., 2006; Bhatkar et al., 2003; Forrest et al., 1997) 
can be employed to generate duplicates of programs in each given virtual machine. Since 
such duplicates are not present beyond the boundary of the given VM, the programme 
pages will not be copied, and sharing will be blocked. Diversifying the programme at 
execution time (Curtsinger and Berger, 2013) will block sharing of the programme text 
even if the adversary has been able to access the binary file (Yarom and Falkner, 2014). 
Another countermeasure to mitigate the occurrence of a Flush+Reload Attack is to turn off 
memory deduplication (Yarom and Falkner, 2014). Similarly, preventing page sharing can 
block the occurrence of this attack.   
 
4.4 Constant Time Techniques 
One method of safeguarding cryptographic code is to implement the code in such 
a way that its performance will not be reliant upon data. This denotes, for instance, that the 
order of cache accesses will not rely on the key or plaintext. This technique is common to 
address the runtime and also to be used in local contention-based channels (Ge et al., 2016; 
Bernstein, 2005). In this regard, Brickell (2011) recommends not using secret-dependent 
memory access “at coarser than cache line granularity”. Similarly, others (Bernstein et al., 
2013; Osvik et al., 2006) have argued that processors such as Intel processor can emit low-
address-bit information (this is the offset in a cache line). This argument is further backed 
up by Yarom et al. (2017), who were able to demonstrate that OpenSSL implementation 
was susceptible to the CacheBleed attack. Coppens et al. (2009) revealed numerous leaks 
such as instructions with “data-dependent runtimes, register dependencies and data 
dependencies through memory”. However, no implementation is so far understood to have 
been compromised by side-channel attacks via such leaks. Other researchers (Valgrind, 
2017 and Langley, 2010) have introduced examination applications to direct the 
implementation of constant time code. These tools can monitor the flow of secret 
information to inform whether such information is being utilised in branches or as a 
memory index (Ge et al., 2016). 
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Köpf et al. (2012) introduced a method for automatically extracting “upper 
bounds” on the quantity of information concerning the input that an attacker can derive 
from a program by monitoring the CPU’s cache performance. This method, that facilitates 
the measuring procedure, is built on top of the “AbsInt TimingExplorer”, which is claimed 
to be one of the most advanced engines for static cache analysis. Doychev et al. (2015) 
built upon Köpf et al’s (2012) work and proposed CacheAudit, which is a multipurpose 
framework for the automatic examination of cache side channels that facilitates more 
effective abstractions and a higher accuracy. The contribution of Köpf et al’s (2012) work 
consists of new abstractions to compute accurate “over-approximations” of the potential 
side-channel monitoring for attackers. Such approximations result in producing “upper 
bounds” on the quantity of information which is exposed.  
 
Andrysco et al. (2015) proposed a benchmark that counts the timing mutability of 
floating point operations. As part of their study, Andrysco et al. (2015) also developed a 
“fixed-point, constant-time math library titled ‘libfixedtimefixedpoint’” to mitigate the 
timing channel on floating-point operations. Rane et al. (2016) introduced a 
countermeasure that blocks side channels introduced by floating-point computations while 
maintaining the accuracy of non-secure operations. This countermeasure takes advantage 
of microarchitectural elements of the SIMD lanes in x86 SSE and SSE2 instruction sets 
architecture to facilitate fixed time floating-point executions. The main perception 
underlying Rane et al.’s Escort’s secure executions as shown in Figure 3, acquired and 
modified from Rane et al.’s (2016) study, is that the latent period of SIMD instructions are 
decided by the lowest execution between the SMID lanes. 
 
Figure 3. The main insight underlying Rane et al.’s Escort’s secure executions (Rane et al., 
2016). 
 
Thus, this Escort compiler can facilitate the execution of each instruction together 
with a dummy instruction, the operand of which will result in generating the longest latent 
period. Rane et al.’s (2016) assessment reveals a 0 to 1.5% timing difference of floating-
point executions with various types of inputs on the testing machine. Ge et al. (2016) argues 
that the key shortcoming of such a method is that a constant-time operation on one 
hardware platform is likely not to perform on a different hardware platform. To attest their 
point, Ge et al. (2016) refer to Cock et al.’s (2014) study, in which Cock et al. illustrated 
that the constant-time fix for preventing Lucky 13 attack (Al Fardan and Paterson, 2013), 
a type of a remote SCA, in OpenSSL 1.0.1e still comprises a side channel on the ARM 
AM3358 platform. 
 
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
    
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
4.5 Virtual Time 
The virtual time method attempts to eradicate access to real time, presenting only 
virtual clocks, the progress of which is entirely deterministic, and independent of the 
operations of susceptible elements. Deterministic operation can present various 
advantages, for instance, in relation to debugging, fault tolerance, and security (Ge et al., 
2016; Aviram et al., 2012). However, existing techniques of performing parallel programs 
tend to bring about high costs and permit misbehaved software applications to outdo 
repeatability (Aviram et al., 2012). Therefore, to deal with such issues, one can employ a 
parallel programming paradigm in combinations with “Determinator” (Aviram et al., 2012) 
that should be implemented in a way to transform write/write conflicts into identified 
contentions conflicts as shown in Figure 4, obtained and modified from Aviram et al.’s 
(2012) Study. 
 
Figure 4. The kernel’s hierarchy of spaces with each having private register and virtual 
memory state (Aviram et al., 2012). 
 
 
Ford (2012) built upon the Aviram et al.’s (2012) model by presenting queues to 
enable carefully I/O with the outside world without introducing real-time clocks. Similarly, 
Wu et al. (2015) built upon Ford et al.’s (2015) model by introducing a prototype 
“hypervisor-enforced timing mitigation” to regulate timing channels in cloud 
environments. This method blocks “reference clocks” that are internal to the cloud by 
enforcing a deterministic view of time on guest code, and employs “timing mitigators to 
pace I/O and rate-limit potential information emission to external observers. 
 
4.6 Countermeasures against Timing Attacks on RSA 
One method to mitigate Timing Attacks against RSA is to cause the decoding 
process to take a continuous amount of time for every ciphertext (the outcome of 
encryption carried out on plaintext employing an algorithm). It should be noted that this 
method can considerably affect performance. Therefore, to avoid the reduction in 
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performance, cryptographic blinding technique (CBT) can instead be employed in the RSA 
implementations. The CBT takes advantage of RSA’s multiplicative property. This denotes 
that rather than computing cd (mod n), one should select a secret random value r and 
compute (rec)d (mod n). The outcome of such computation process when utilising Euler’s 
Theorem will be rcd (mod n). Thus, the impact of r can be eliminated through 
multiplication of its reverse. A new value of r must then be selected for each ciphertext. 
After the CBT has been applied successfully, the decoding time will no longer be 
associated with the value of the input ciphertext. As a result, the TBSCA will end in failure. 
CBT, itself, might be prone to Timing Attacks by ‘very advanced’ attackers. However, at 
this stage, we do not have any data that can substantiate such an assumption. However, as 
a future work, we are aiming to carry out a set of experimental Timing Attacks against the 
CBT to determine whether we can substantiate this assumption by attempting to break the 
CBT (i.e. if we can exfiltrate the private key) either fully or partially. 
 
4.7 Network On-Chip and Quashi Partitioning 
By temporally-partitioning arbitrators, network capacity can be dynamically 
assigned to domain in order to mitigate TBSCAs by contending on “on-chip interconnects”. 
To mitigate timing channel attacks enabled by on-chip network, Wang and Suh (2012) 
proposed an implementation that employs “priority-based arbitration” and a “static limit 
mechanism” to facilitate one-way information-emission protection. Wang and Suh’s 
(2012) results revealed that the protection design eradicated a timing channel from high-
security to low-security domains while performance overheads were kept to minimum for 
traffic patterns. Also, decreasing the conflict and efficacy of TBSCAs also requires 
stopping an adversary from dominating resources. Zhou et al. (2016) proposed an approach 
to prevent TBSCAs that exploit LLCs (the last level caches) shared between cores to emit 
information between security domains. As part of their study, Zhou et al. (2016) 
implemented the CacheBar, a memory management subsystem, to prevent TBSCAs within 
cloud environments. The CacheBar dynamically ejects memory contents from the cache so 
that protection domains reside only in a restricted quantity in each cache set. According to 
Ge et al. (2016), CacheBar is fundamentally a software design of the solution that 
Domnitser et al. (2012) proposed. 
 
4.8 Performance Counters 
Counter-based detection along with machine learning methods can also be utilised 
in PC platforms to detect TBSCAs and restrict the level of emitted information (Chiappetta, 
2016). Furthermore, performance counters can also be applied within a cloud environment 
to identify cross-VM SCAs. In this regard, CloudRadar (Zhang et al., 2016, a) 
implementation can be used to identify SCAs in multi-tenant cloud systems. This 
implementation functions by taking advantage of signature-based detection to determine 
the cryptography process performed by the safeguarded virtual machine (VM).  It also 
utilises “anomaly-based detection” methods to observe the co-located VMs so that 
abnormal cache behaviours (that are common in SCAs) can be detected. CloudRadar 
appears to be an effective implementation in mitigating SCAs within a cloud setting. It uses 
“metamorphic attack” code which makes the implementation difficult to bypass by the 
attackers. A similar implementation setting titled “Cloak” (Gruss et al., 2017, a), which is 
also designed for application in a cloud setting, can deal with SCAs in multi-tenant settings. 
This implementation leverages “hardware transactional memory” to block the attackers 
from monitoring cache misses of secret code and data. Cloak has been reported to be 
capable of blocking data emission (which is caused through side channels) from “enclaves” 
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
    
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
dealing with one of the shortcomings of SGX (Gruss et al., 2017, a).  Figure 5. demonstrates 
the code for decision tree categorisation of Gruss et al.’s (2017, a) Cloak. 
 
Figure 4. The kernel’s hierarchy of spaces with each having private register and virtual 
memory state (Aviram et al., 2012). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.9 Defence Methods Suggested in the Literature 
Kocher (1996) stated that attackers could potentially identify fixed Diffie-
Hellman exponents, factor RSA keys, and break other cryptosystems by calculating time 
needed to perform private key executions. As a result, he proposed various techniques for 
mitigating the attacks against RSA and presented Diffie-Hellman. Brickell et al. (2006, b) 
proposed several countermeasures against SCAs. They state that permuting the AES 
lookup tables can mitigate Access-Driven Attacks and suggest the uses of smaller lookup 
tables such as original AES S-box, during the first and last rounds of AES computations 
(Aciiçmez, 2009). Aciiçmez et al. (2007) examined the ability of the RSA implementation 
of OpenSSL-0.9.7. To this end, they focused on Branch Prediction Analysis and identified 
multiple several flaws that needed to be addressed. Acıiçmez et al. (2007) informed the 
OpenSSL organisation of such vulnerabilities and suggested the removal of certain 
conditional branches that could impact the strength of RSA implementations. As a result, 
OpenSSL organisation considered the proposal and made the suggested modification to 
their RSA implementations. In the same vain, Agosta et al. (2007) proposed a defence 
mechanism for susceptibilities found in branch prediction. In this regard, they proposed the 
implementation of conditional branches via indirect branching.  
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Stating that SCAs could compromise a system’s confidentiality by exploiting 
information leakage from the victim system, Zhang and Lee (2014) suggested an 
Interference Matrix to assess a system’s susceptibilities to SCAs. Inam et al. (2014) 
proposed an implementation of the Multi-Resource Server (MRS) which allows predictable 
performance of real-time applications on multi-core platforms. The MRS presents temporal 
abstraction between operations executed on the same core and operations executed on 
different cores. The latter could, without MRS, interfere with each other due to contention 
on a shared memory bus. Inam et al. (2014) illustrated that that the MRS can be applied 
“to encapsulate legacy systems” and to provide adequate resources to achieve their goal. 
Doychev et al. (2015) suggested a framework titled “CacheAudit” for the automatic, static 
examination of side channels. Hunger et al. (2015) presented a method for detecting savvy 
attackers who attempted to hide while executing covert channel eavesdropping attacks. 
Chiappetta et al. (2016) proposed a method for real time detection of SCAs by employing 
hardware performance counters. Arguing that SCAs would pose security threats in multi-
tenant environments such as modern cloud data centers, Gruss et al. (2017, a) proposed 
Clock to mitigate malicious monitoring of cache misses on secret code and data.  
 
In addition to the above suggested defence mechanisms, Selective Partitioning 
and the Random Permutation Cache (RPCache) can also be used as counter-measures to 
prevent certain Cache-Based Side-Channel Attacks with minimal hardware costs and 
insignificant performance effect (Wang and Lee, 2007). Covert Channels that are based on 
Intel Quick Path Interconnect (QPI) lock mechanism have also been identified (Gruss et 
al., 2017, a; Gruss et al., 2017, b; Wu et al., 2012). One method of mitigating TBSCAs is 
to utilise per-domain queuing structure and static allocation of time slots in the scheduling 
algorithm (Evtyushkin et al., 2015; Wang et al., 2014).  A framework titled ‘CC-Hunter” 
has also been proposed to identify the presence of covert channels by dynamically tracking 
conflict patterns over employment of shared processor hardware (Evtyushkin et al., 2015; 
Chen, J. and Venkataramani, 2014). Since the CCHunter is built around identifying 
conflict, it is not relevant to identifying the covert channels via branch predictors as such 
channels are not generated based upon conflict. Gate-Level Information Flow Tracking 
(GLIFT), a mechanism that constructs the system from the ground up, can also be 
employed to identify TBSCAs (Oberg et al., 2014; Tiwari et al., 2009). Evtyushkin et al. 
(2015) state that while GLIFT can be effective, it necessitates substantial “rearchitecting 
and redesign of the entire system”. 
 
One of the countermeasures against Evict+Time Attacks is to adopt Complex 
Addressing Functions and Replacement Policies of modern processors that can render 
ejection harder and as a result Evict+Time Attacks more difficult. There exist other 
countermeasures focusing on identifying side-channel emissions, for instance through 
static source code analysis (Doychev et al., 2015; Köpf et al., 2012) or by conducting 
“anomaly detection” employing CPU performance counters (Gruss et al., 2017, a; Gruss et 
al., 2017, b; Chiappetta et al., 2015). Gruss et al. (2016) delved into the latter method and 
implemented an attack technique titled “Flush+Flush”, a variation of Flush+Reload, that 
could bypass it. The Flush+Flush attack depends only on the runtime of the flush 
instruction and data that is cached.  This technique does not make “any memory accesses” 
as opposed to other cache attacks. As a result, it does not generate cache misses. 
Consequently, the Flush+Flush attacks are very quiet. This denotes that the “spy process” 
cannot be noticed based on cache hits and misses.  
 
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
    
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
Last, but not least, the usage of caches in the memory system can result in 
considerable reduction of efficient memory access time even though it is one of the most 
essential characteristics for enhancing performance in modern processors. Nevertheless, 
the different access time features because of cache hits and misses create information 
emission that an attacker can exploit. Therefore, to mitigate this threat, one can simply 
deactivate cache. However, this approach can significantly degrade the system 
performance which becomes another major issue on its own right.   
 
5. Discussion  
In this extended study, we provided an overview of various Timing Attack 
vectors, followed by a detailed examination of countermeasures that can be employed to 
mitigate such attacks. Through the findings of the study, we can deduce that despite the 
many advancements in computer security, SCAs continue to evolve and wreck a havoc on 
shared, modern computing hardware. Our study shows that security researchers are simply 
playing a catch-up game with criminals. This is demonstrated by the various sophisticated 
TBSCAs that have been illustrated in the literature that can pose various security threats 
against the users of such systems. Everytime a new side channel susceptibility is 
discovered, a new mitigation research path also begins. As a result, security researchers 
have proposed several countermeasures and continue to suggest new ones. However, 
despite being useful, these proposed countermeasures are often limited to academic 
suggestions and are either ineffective or unable to address practical TBSCAs fully. 
Furthermore, almost all of the existing solutions incur significant overheads or degradation 
in computing performance, which, in turn, weakens the optimisation of modern computing 
hardware such as processors. The level of such overheads and degradation in hardware 
performance, often caused by the methods, themselves, has not been adequately reported 
in the research papers. Thus, it is difficult to assess the effectiveness of such proposed 
countermeasures. It is also reasonable to state that an interaction between 
Microarchitectural side channels on one hand and inclination to optimise hardware 
performance via Microarchitectural improvements on the other hand have given rise to the 
absence of reliable defence mechanisms when producing hardware components.  
 
Adding to the above aforementioned issues, it is clear that the existing 
countermeasures for TBSCAs are not proactive but reactive in that they are there to 
mitigate single, specific attacks that are known to the research community. Nor are they 
generic to be able to address future, unknown attacks that take advantage of other variations 
of SCAs. Moreover, there is very little information provided in the existing studies with 
regards to false positives and negatives of the proposed defence techniques. Likewise, 
although the effectiveness of some of these defence mechanisms can be evaluated against 
various criteria, such assessment has been limited to qualitative analysis, a point also 
acknowledged by Zhang and Lee (2014). 
 
6. Research Directions 
In light of the discussion presented in the previous section, as potential directions 
for future research, we, therefore, recommend the followings: 
 
1. The focus of many studies has been on side channels, for instance via branch 
prediction units. Thus, it is imperative that future studies take into account 
mitigation methods that can address the potentials for both side channels and 
covert channels, for instance, via shared branch prediction units and also other 
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shared properties.  
 
2. Generic countermeasures will need to be devised that can be independent of both 
application and architecture to mitigate the majority of known and unknown 
TBSCAs. Such countermeasures must make it extremely difficult for an adversary 
to be able to differentiate between various types of side channels. We believe that 
it is by adopting such an approach that a SCA can be proactively foiled in advance 
of the attack being carried out.  
 
3. In relation to the point 2, proactive countermeasures must not necessitate a 
significant modification of hardware and must not certainly result in degradation 
of system performance or an increase in overheads. 
 
4. To provide accurate measurements in relation to the efficacy of the proposed 
countermeasures, quantitative methods will need to be developed to be able to 
determine the true potential values of such countermeasures. 
 
5. Aciiçmez et al. (2007) report several attack scenarios aimed at RSA that take 
advantage of the CPU’s Branch Prediction Unit. Therefore, developing effective 
countermeasures against these attacks can be considered a feasible direction for 
future research. For instance, studies need to be performed to determine whether 
these attacks can be successfully carried against symmetric-key algorithms that 
utilise the same cryptographic keys for both encryption of plaintext and 
decryption of ciphertext. In cases where an algorithm is proved to be susceptible, 
changes will need to be applied to it.  
 
6. All Microarchitectural attacks, irrespective of their type, can exploit security 
systems regardless of advanced partitioning methods (e.g. memory protection), 
sandboxing or even virtualisation. Hence, it is vital to identify every conceivable 
Microarchitectural susceptibility in order to comprehend the potential of 
Microarchitectural analysis and design to implement more secure systems. This 
can be achieved by employing appropriate software countermeasures and making 
specific hardware changes in future architectures.  
 
7. The topic of SCAs against mobile devices is a new area of research that still lacks 
adequate studies. Thus, more works need to be carried out in the domain of side 
channels in mobile devices. From the discussion presented in this study, it can be 
deduced that the existence of specific multi-threading architectures necessitates a 
profound comprehension of the interaction between the underpinning hardware 
and software so that one is able to evaluate the true ramifications of the discussed 
security more effectively. 
 
8. Last, but not least, as future work, we intend to identify more side channels 
resulting from the inherent vulnerabilities that exist in PC hardware components 
such as processors and caches, and find solutions to this increasing security threat. 
We believe that this study will inspire new studies in the implementations of 
secure PC hardware that do not undermine performance, cost and energy 
consumption. 
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